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Introduction  
 
Political and religious violence in northern Nigeria has regularly spread to Niger. The recent 
development of Boko Haram in Nigeria has provoked new concern. Engaged in an armed 
 
1 Corresponding Author Contact: Florian Morier, Email: fmorier@hotmail.fr, Brussels, Belgium  
Abstract 
In an attempt to facilitate transition from conflict to peace, Disengagement, Disassociation, 
Reintegration and Reconciliation (DDRR) initiatives are key in fostering national dialogue 
and reconciliation. While much literature exists on the disengagement component of the 
process, very few scholars have documented in detail the screening phase and its 
challenges. Indeed, the screening phase is critical to ensure the success of a DDRR 
program, especially in contexts dominated by non-state armed groups (NSAGs). This 
publication examines how the Government of Niger (GoN) implements the screening 
process for disengaged combatants associated with Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa 
(BH/ISIS-WA). Thanks to the screening process, this article also explores the linkages 
between BH/ISIS-WA surrenders and judicial actors, as an opportunity to collect 
information on arrested associates in an environment with weak state presence 
characterized by heightened insecurity. The Government of Niger has made progress in the 
treatment of defectors by updating its legal framework, through the creation of a National 
Program on disengaged combatants and the set-up of an action plan to seek international 
support. The GoN is therefore trying to align itself based on respect for the International 
humanitarian laws and United Nations resolutions, in order to promote the human rights of 
both BH/ISIS-WA repentants and the communities into which they integrate. Additionally, 
the GoN strives to integrate lessons learnt from other Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (DDR) programs dealing with Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) 
across the African continent, in particular the case of Somalia. The overall process is 
managed by the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) but includes several other governmental 
agencies as well. In some instances, parts of the DDR implementation chain benefit from 
the support of international partners. The author of this article was in charge of providing 
technical assistance to the Government of Niger in developing a national strategy for 
disengaged persons associated with BH/ISIS-WA. He also assisted state actors to 
implement program components, such as the screening phase and the legal framework. 
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struggle with the Nigerian security forces since 2009, the movement has developed rear bases 
in Niger, especially in the region of Diffa.2  
Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa (BH/ISIS-WA’s) ambition to capture territory 
beyond Nigeria’s borders escalated in 2015 with the spread of its fighting ground into Niger. 
From the outset, the Government of Niger (GoN) has responded to the threat largely by 
keeping BH/ISIS-WA under surveillance. In this effort, the GoN initiated the National 
Program (“Programme National de Prise en Charge de la Reddition des Elements de Boko 
Haram”). This document describes all the Disengagement, Disassociation, Reintegration and 
Reconciliation (DDRR) steps for former BH/ISIS-WA fighters and affiliates, from defection 
to actual reintegration within the community, including screening, transfer to the 
Goudoumaria Reception Center and rehabilitation.  
In the absence of formal commitments or a peace agreement between the parties of the 
conflict, the approach taken by Niger differs from the more “traditional” Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs. Traditionally, a series of preconditions 
have to be met at the start of a DDR program: the signing of a peace agreement to provide a 
legal framework, the willingness of the conflicting parties to engage in DDR and a minimum 
guarantee of security.3 Niger falls short of these preconditions and paves the way for a more 
innovative approach to DDR. Particular emphasis is placed on the notion of disengagement, 
whereby those associated with NSAGs are encouraged to voluntarily defect.  
On the basis of the legal framework established through the National Program in 
Niger, disengaged combatants can only receive support from the rehabilitation and 
reintegration program under certain conditions. They must have passed a robust screening 
process and be granted immunity from prosecution for their involvement in BH/ISIS-WA. 
Based on the results of the screening phase, a triage is carried out in order to establish whether 
an ex-combatant can be exempted from prosecution. The screening procedure is designed to 
avoid providing assistance to violators of international humanitarian law and therefore makes 
this step a decisive factor for the success of DDR.  
 
2 International Crisis Group, Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel? Africa Report N°208, 19 September 2013 
3 The Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), https://www.unddr.org/iddrs.aspx 
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A number of conflicting political forces are at play during the triage process.4 On the 
one hand, there is pressure to accelerate the procedure and -if possible- cancel the triage to 
offer blanket amnesty to all BH/ISIS-WA affiliates in order to encourage defections and 
weaken BH/ISIS-WA. On the other hand, there is a need for a rigorous and accurate screening 
to ensure that known or suspected violators of human rights are prosecuted. Indeed, this 
screening phase is particularly challenging because of the duality between applying judicial 
norms and detering BH/ISIS-WA combatants from partaking in the DDRR program. The 
GoN’s National Program first set into motion during the outbreak of the conflict was 
formalized in June 2018 with the support of the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) of which the author of this paper was in charge at the time.5 As a result of collaborative 
work between state actors and partners from the international community, the implementation 
of the National Program is now well underway and has reached the screening phase. Despite 
testing the procedures, this is a key step in the implementation of the National Program.  
Within the context of Niger’s National Program, this paper explores the background 
and the characteristics of the screening process, including all of the involved steps and the 
challenges faced in its implementation. This paper also presents the legal framework of the 
National Program and the main tools guiding the process. 
 
The Context 
 
Niger is located in the Southern belt of the Sahara and lies at the heart of the West African 
Sahel. It is a vast, landlocked country prone to a volatile security situation at the epicenter of 
geopolitical turmoil. The country is currently ranked as the least developed country in the 
world (189/189 UNDP HDI 2018).  
 
4 Numerous working meetings with stakeholders from the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior and 
Governor of Diffa between February 2018 and June 2018. 
5 Workshop organized by IOM and the MoI «Atelier de Partage du Programme National de Prise en Charge de la 
reddition des éléments de Boko Hara », Niamey, 19-20 February 2019 
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The Diffa region has many cultural and economic links with northern Nigeria. To 
understand the appearance of Boko Haram in Diffa, it is necessary to go back to the 2000s. At 
that time, the ideological teachings of the former leader of Boko Haram, Mohamed Yusuf, 
had a strong impact in the Diffa region. Among the thousands of Nigerians, both men and 
women, who went to study or work in Maiduguri, many heard Yusuf's messages and some 
attended his mosque. Back in Niger, they spread his ideology: Yusuf's deputy and future 
successor at the head of Boko Haram, Aboubakar Shekau, also had family ties in the area and 
came to preach in Diffa before 2009.6  
Since 2015, BH/ISIS-WA has been leading an insurgency against the Nigerien 
security forces and civilians, defying government attempts to destroy the group. Despite the 
engagement of Nigerien security forces in an armed conflict with BH/ISIS-WA – a Non-State 
Armed Group (NSAG) rooted in neighboring Nigeria - the region of Diffa in the south-east of 
Niger has been particularly affected. The conflict has led to an influx of refugees and 
generated even more resource scarcity for host communities.   
In February 2015, Niger started to face direct attacks on its territory from NSAG 
associates with attacks in Bosso and Diffa.7 As a response, the GoN banned both the 
production and commercialization of red pepper and fish in an attempt to cut BH/ISIS-WA 
funding sources. The ban was part of a larger set of state emergency measures. The fishing 
ban alongside restrictions on pepper and population movement crippled the local economy, 
causing further hardship to local populations.8  
This crisis, affecting local communities and rendering them subject to displacement, 
challenges the population’s resilience and heightens the risk of recruitment by Violent 
Extremist Organizations (VEOs). As of today (September 2019), the GoN has not engaged in 
any official negotiations with BH/ISIS-WA. The official position of the international 
 
6 International Crisis Group, Niger and Boko Haram:  Beyond Counter-insurgency, Africa Report N°245, 27 
February 2017 
7 UNOCHA, Niger: Small farmers are paying the price for the lingering insecurity in Diffa, 
https://www.unocha.org/story/niger-small-farmers-are-paying-price-lingering-insecurity-diffa-en-fr, 3 October 
2017 
8 Interviews conducted by IOM in Diffa with the Univeristy of Diffa and community leaders in February 2018. 
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community, including the United Nations and a number of other partners, is, that there should 
not be any negotiations with VEOs.9 
Over the course of the crisis, large numbers of individuals suspected of association 
with NSAGs were arrested by the Defence and Security Forces.10 As reported by the 
International Crisis Group in February 2017, the number of prisoners linked to BH/ISIS-WA 
has steadily increased over the past four years.11  
In 2016, the number of prisoners was over 1200 and at the beginning of 2017, it had 
increased to almost 1700.12  Between March 2017 and December 2018, several trials led to 
the release of 443 individuals due to a lack of evidence. Another 115 were sentenced. 410 still 
await trial and are preventively detained in the Koutoukalé, Kollo and Niamey prisons.13 
Furthermore, in these specific prisons but also in other penitentiaries, low-risk and high-risk 
ex-BH/ISIS-WA affiliates are kept in custody together. This increases the risk of relapse to 
violence and the exposure to a broader radical environment. Mixing low-risk custody 
detainees and high-risk custody detainees is recogonized by GoN as problematic in detention 
environments.14 
In December 2016, the Minister of Interior, Public Security and Customary and 
Religious Affairs (MoI) and the Governor of Diffa Region announced the beginning of an 
outreach policy towards BH/ISIS-WA surrenders, asking families whose children had joined 
BH/ISIS-WA to spread the word of an amnesty. Fighters were told that if they surrendered, 
they would be forgiven rather than prosecuted. It was also stated that surrenders would be 
given the opportunity to enroll in a rehabilitation program. The official communication 
 
9 UN Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Boko Haram to Its Sanctions List, paragraph 17 of 
resolution 2083 (2012) 
10 As of July 2018, there were 968 detained Boko Haram associates (534 Nigeriens, 407 Nigerians, 20 Chadians, 
2 Cameroonians) in Nigerien detention facilities across the country, from Ministry of Justice, July 2018. 
11 International Crisis Group. 2017. Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-insurgency REPORT  245: Africa, 
27 February. 
12 International Crisis Group. 2017. Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-insurgency REPORT  245: Africa, 
27 February.  
13 Judicial Pole Specialized in the fight against Terrorism and Transnational Crime, April 2019 
14 Interviews conducted by IOM in Niamey with stakeholders from the Ministry of Justice in February 2018 
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appeared to offer blanket amnesty for crimes, including for those who had committed serious 
crimes during their engagement in BH/ISIS-WA. 
The MoI drafted a short document named “Document Cadre de prise en charge de la 
reddition des éléments de Boko Haram”15 in December 2016. The document briefly explains 
the plan to offer a rehabilitation program for defectors and mainly focuses on professional 
training. 
At the same time, and based on this document, the MoI initiated the construction of a 
center, located near Goudoumaria in Diffa Region, to provide accommodation and security to 
the defectors and their dependents. The management of the center is assigned to the Garde 
Nationale du Niger (GNN). 
Due to increasing military pressure on the NSAG, the number of BH/ISIS-WA 
associates who surrendered to community leaders and administrative authorities in Diffa 
steadily increased. While in 2017 approximately 150 individuals surrendered to the Governor 
of Diffa in response to the promise of amnesty, numerous spontaneous defections are still 
regularly reported reaching up to 235 (including their dependents) until September 2019.16  
Given the probability that former BH/ISIS-WA combatants and associates possess 
critical information that could support military operations to counter BH/ISIS-WA’s 
influence, the GoN interviewed them immediately upon their arrival in Diffa. The newcomers 
first spent an average of one week in Diffa before being transferred to the newly built 
Goudoumaria Reception Center. Once arrived in Goudoumaria, security actors such as GNN, 
military intelligence and SCLCT conducted new rounds of interviews.17  
Some pieces of information collected through the aforementioned interviews were 
used in the trials of arrested individuals associated with BH/ISIS-WA. This collaboration was 
permitted by a provision in Nigerien law that grants immunity from prosecution for those who 
provide information that enable the prevention of an attack.18  
 
15 Document Cadre de prise en charge de la reddition des éléments de Boko Haram, 2017 
16 Garde National of Niger (GNN) in Goudoumaria, September 2019 
17 Assessment on the registration process conducted by IOM with the Pôle Spécialisé against Terrorism and the 
SCLCT between June to October 2018 
18 Code pénal, Art. 399.1.20, Ord. n°2011-12 du 27 janvier 2011 
  
 
 
 
 
Florian Morier: The screening process of disengaged Boko Haram associates in Niger 
 
 
 
 
123 
Since their arrival at the Goudoumaria Reception Center, defectors have been expected 
to enroll in the rehabilitation program, as per the promise of amnesty that was communicated 
while the legal framework was still under development.19 However, in the absence of a legal 
framework to clarify and detail the defection process and the status of the rehabilitation camp, 
no distinction has been made between different categories of defectors in the Goudoumaria 
Reception Center. From an operational perspective, defectors are not allowed to go outside of 
the Center, except under specific conditions, and the facilities in the Center are divided 
between families, singles and youth.20 
 
The Legal Framework 
 
In order to better understand the legal framework in Niger, it is important to highlight the 
distinction between arrested individuals and disengaged NSAG associates. The legal 
frameworks guiding these two approaches have evolved according to different logics: on the 
one hand, to effectively prosecute perpetrators of crimes and, on the other hand, to create 
conditions for combatants to abandon the NSAG and benefit from a rehabilitation program.21 
While the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) manages the process for arrested individuals, the MoI is 
in charge of disengaged combatants.22 
Over the past ten years, the GoN has developed a comprehensive counterterrorism 
institutional framework. In January 2011, the MoJ established a Specialized Judicial Unit 
against Terrorism and Transnational Crime (Pôle Judiciaire Spécialisé en matière de lutte 
contre le Terrorisme et la Criminalité Transnationale).23 In the same year, the government 
 
19 Interviews conducted by IOM in the center of Goudoumaria with surenders in March 2018 
20 Assessment conducted by IOM in the center of Goudoumaria in March 2018 
21 Several meetings conducted by IOM with the Prosecutors and the Governor of Diffa between February 2018 
and June 2018 
22 Assessment on the institutional framework conducted by IOM in March 2018 
23 Ord. n° 2011-12 du 27 janvier 2011 
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also created a Central Service for Combating Terrorism (Service Central de Lutte Contre le 
Terrorisme - SCLCT) in charge of all investigations related to the fight against terrorism.24 
A series of counterterrorism laws were also passed in 201125 including a law regarding 
amnesty for defectors. At that time, exemption from prosecution could be granted under one 
specific condition: defectors had to provide information that could prevent an attack from 
being carried out.26 Meanwhile, defectors who denounced other members of BH/ISIS-WA 
could have their sentence reduced.27  
 
- “Any member of a group planning a terrorist act is exempt from prosecution if, having 
notified the administrative or judicial authority, it has prevented the commission of the 
offence”.28 
 
- “Any member of a group that has participated in the commission of a terrorist act and 
provides the administrative or judicial authority with any information enabling the 
perpetrators of the offence to be identified may benefit from the mitigating 
circumstances provided for in Articles 53 and 54 of the Criminal Code”.29 
The aim of this last paragraph is to encourage collaborations between disengaged 
individuals associated with VEOs and judicial actors by offering reduced sentence to 
defectors who committed serious crimes. In order to be effective, this information exchange 
needs to be correctly organized and documented by the Prosecutor’s office. While the 
counterterrorism institutional framework was still in its initial phase, the Government decreed 
the state of emergency in the Diffa region in February 2015. In this context, the Security 
Forces engaged in Diffa made a number of arrests although their procedures were not yet 
 
24 Arrête n°0045 MI/S/D/AR/DGPN, portant création, attribution et organisation du Service Central de Lutte 
Contre le terrorisme (SCLCT), 28 janvier 2011 
25 Arts. 399.1.2; 399.1.3; 399.1.6; 399.1.8; 399.1.9; 399.1.12; and 399.1.14, Ord. N° 2011-12 
26 Code pénal, Art. 399.1.20, Ord. n°2011-12 du 27 janvier 2011 
27 Ibid 
28 Code pénal, Art. 399.1.20, Ord. n°2011-12 du 27 janvier 2011 
29 Ibid. 
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aligned with the needs of the Pôle Spécialisé against Terrorism. These arrests were 
characterized by a lack of data collection and a weak management system of the collected 
data. The Specialized Judicial Unit did not have enough evidence to set-up a case and its 
capacity to organize trials was lacking.30 Prisons in Niamey soon became overcrowded and 
suspects could spend up to two years in pre-trial detention.31 In 2017, the SCLCT initiated 
preliminary investigations for each arrest when it was deemed possible. This operation 
slightly reduced the number of individuals transferred to Niamey in preventive detention. 
In 2016, the Nigerien MoI promised to extend amnesty to any member of BH/ISIS-
WA who would cooperate with the authorities and accept to undergo rehabilitation. During 
the development of the legal framework for disengaged combatants, the rehabilitation process 
could not start. Furthermore, when the first NSAG associates started to surrender in 2016, 
they had no information to share about a planned terrorist attack from BH/ISIS-WA and could 
therefore not be granted immunity. As a result, those who surrendered were in a legal limbo, 
and, together with their dependents, had no other option than to stay in the Goudoumaria 
Transit Center protected by the GNN.  
Since March 2017, the trials of the arrested individuals took place with the support of 
international partners, that included the provision of financial resources for lawyers. Between 
2017 and 2018, 997 individuals were prosecuted for terrorist activities and only 183 were 
sentenced (18%). The judges from the Pôle Spécialisé had to organize the trials with the 
limited evidences or witnesses they could gather. In some cases, the Goudoumaria 
rehabilitation center was used to verify information about arrested individuals through mobile 
phone with disengaged combatants during trials.32 This practice was considered to be in line 
with the provision of the law stipulating that defectors who denounced other members of 
BH/ISIS-WA could have their sentence reduced.33 
 
30 Assessment on the registration process conducted by IOM with the Pôle Spécialisé against Terrorism and the 
SCLCT between June to October 2018 
31 Meeting with the Head of reinsertion at the MoJ in June 2018 
32 IOM participated as an observer in the Boko Haram trials in Niamey in March 2018 
33 Code pénal, Art. 399.1.20, Ord. n°2011-12 du 27 janvier 2011 
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In June 2018, Nigerien authorities finalized the drafting of the National Program on 
disengaged combatants. The MoI initially intended to wait for the legal framework to be 
updated before officially presenting the National Program to international partners. However, 
due to financial time constraints, international partners urged the National Program to move 
forward. Following discussions between the MoI and MoJ on the text and the submission 
process, the Head of the Legal Reform drafted the law to allow defectors to join a 
rehabilitation program under specific conditions.  
The draft law was shared with the national parliament for adoption which debated it, 
notably questioning the screening system.34 Eventually, on 19 December 2018, the 
amendment to the Penal Code was promulgated without opposing votes.35 The basis of this 
legal framework is a modification to Article 399.1.20 of Law No. 61-27 of the 15 July 1961 
decree establishing Niger's Penal Code. The law defines the conditions under which a person 
associated with a VEO can participate in the rehabilitation program. The new paragraph was 
added in the article 399-1.20 in December 2018: 
 
- “Any member of a group that has participated in the commission of a terrorist act that 
voluntarily surrenders may also be exempt from criminal prosecution, except for 
perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and any other serious 
crime”.  
This paragraph allows defectors who have not committed serious crimes to benefit 
from a rehabilitation program. In other words, it prevents amnesty from being granted to 
individuals who have committed serious crimes. This possibility implies a screening process. 
This is also the limitation of what the MoI can offer to defectors according to International 
Law and the MoJ.  
 
34 IOM was invited by the MoJ to provide elements of a response to parliamentarians in December 2018 
35 Article 399-1.20, Loi n°2018-86 du 19 décembre 2018 modifiant et complétant la loi n°61-27 du 15 juillet 
1961  
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Regarding the legal basis of the Goudoumaria Reception Center, it was only 
established in February 2019 upon the issuance of an Order by the MoI. This Order on the 
establishment of the Center for defectors associated with BH/ISIS-WA also details the 
management and the rehabilitation process. 
Within the Nigerien legal framework, provisions for the specific treatment of minors 
exist as well. In February 2017, under the leadership of the President of the Republic of Niger, 
a memorandum of understanding on children alleged to be associated with VEOs was signed 
between the GoN and the United Nations system. This agreement allows the return of 
presumed associated children to child protection facilities.  
In 2017, a law on the establishment of Transit and Referral Centers (CTO - Centre de 
Transit et d’Orientation) for children presumed to be associated with VEOs was administered 
by the Ministry for Women and Child Protection.36 With the official adoption of the screening 
process, unaccompanied minors from the Goudoumaria Center have been transferred to the 
CTO as of September 2019. 
 
The National Program for DDRR 
 
In May 2018, IOM organized a consultative workshop in Diffa to discuss the DDR National 
Strategy and the future National Program on disengaged combatants. This discussion involved 
national and local authorities including traditional leaders from affected communities. During 
this workshop, participants agreed that IOM would assist the MoI in drafting a National 
Program for the management of disengaged combatants in the Diffa region.37  
This National Program was drafted in June 2018 and revised by a panel including 
representatives of the MoI, the MoJ, the High Authority for Peacebuilding (La Haute Autorité 
à la Consolidation de la Paix or HACP) and IOM. It provides a policy framework guiding all 
 
36 Arrêté n°000042 /MPF/PE/SG/DL portant création, attribution et fonctionnement de Centres provisoires de 
Transit et d’Orientation pour les enfants supposés pour des enfants supposés associés à des groupes ou forces 
armées et ceux victimes de migration à risque ou de traite, 2017 
37 Report of the workshop on the strategy for the surrender of Boko Haram elements signed by the participants, 
Diffa, 16 May 2018 
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actors involved in the management of disengaged persons associated with BH/ISIS-WA in 
Niger.  
Following the May 2018 workshop, efforts focused on the development of the legal 
framework for disengaged combatants that was then adopted in December 2018. Two months 
later, in February 2019, the MoI organized a workshop with the support of IOM. The National 
Program for defectors was presented to State actors, UN agencies, NGOs and other 
international partners. During the workshop, a two-year action plan was developed to identify 
roles and responsibilities of involved partners. This was a key step for the MoI, to avoid 
programmatic duplications and identify which gaps needed to be filled in order to facilitate 
international donor support. It was also an opportunity to identify inconsistencies in the 
process, namely the non-existence of a Steering Committee and the lack of national 
coordinator appointed despite these provisioned for in the official document (see below).  
 
The Program Phases 
The National Program consists of six central components: institutional framework, 
communication, reception, registration and screening, rehabilitation, reconciliation and 
reintegration.38  
1. The institutional framework: This consists of establishing the legal and institutional 
basis for the implementation of the National Program. It outlines the creation and 
strengthening of the key coordination committees and implementation units (see 
institutional framework below). 
2. Communication: This component focuses on the need to inform communities and 
stakeholders on the National Program to ideally result in waves of defection and to 
sustainably weaken BH/ISIS-WA. To this end, the National Program includes plans to 
assess cultural and community-based perceptions and to develop a communication 
strategy, including the design and dissemination of messages to different audiences. 
 
38 These phases were inspired by the NATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR THE TREATMENT AND HANDLING 
OF DISENGAGING COMBATANTS IN SOMALIA in 2013, in which the author had participated in 
development as a consultant for UNDP; 
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3. Reception: this phase refers to the mechanism for the reception of disengaged 
combatants that involves administrative, traditional leaders and security authorities. 
The standard operating procedures (SOP) related to this component describe the 
various steps of the reception process including the duration, the location, the actors 
involved and their specific tasks. The reception phase covers other aspects, such as the 
collection of weapons, the identification and transfer of unaccompanied minors to the 
CTO as well as the transfer and improvement of services at the Goudoumaria 
Reception center. 
4. Screening: the screening (which is detailed below), includes registration, profiling and 
sorting (triage) of the former combatants. The main objective being to identify the 
individuals who should be exempted from prosecution and are eligible for the 
rehabilitation program from others. It details the different steps of the screening phase 
and the role of the SCLCT in regard to the registration/profiling and of the 
Prosecutor’s office in the triage process. The National Program also foresees capacity 
building activities for the involved actors to carry out this task. The screening part also 
includes specific provisions for people with special needs. 
5. Rehabilitation: this phase is divided into two categories: social rehabilitation, also 
called deradicalization, which includes a psychosocial aspect, and economic 
rehabilitation through vocational trainings. This component also details the modalities 
related to the exit procedure from the Goudoumaria center also named “certification”. 
6. Reconciliation/reintegration: the National Program does not make a clear separation 
between reconciliation and reintegration. They are presented as part of the same set in 
which reintegration is not possible without reconciliation.39 Reconciliation is 
essentially based on communication activities and community revitalization projects 
for the most affected communities. Meanwhile, reintegration focuses on community-
based projects for defectors including a quota of vulnerable youth for the reintegration 
communities in order to avoid creating a sense of preferential treatment. 
 
39 IOM Workshop, Diffa, May 2018 
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The Coordination Mechanism 
The National Program details the official coordination bodies from the national to the 
local level. At the top, the Steering Committee, headed by the MoI, brings together all the 
Ministries and international partners involved in the process. Its primary objective is to 
validate the National Program and to provide guidance at each phase of the National Program.  
The National Program also plans the establishment of a national coordination unit under the 
authority of the MoI, which would be responsible for implementing the recommendations of 
the Steering Committee. A national coordinator is to be appointed to oversee this unit and 
ensure the coherence and coordination of the actions of all parties involved in the process, 
going from national to the local actors. This unit is also responsible for organizing meetings 
with technical partners and serves as the Secretariat of the Steering Committee.  
At the local level, the National Program is implemented by the Governorate of Diffa 
through its regional coordination committee. This regional committee involves all other 
regional stakeholders, including Ministries, NGOs and United Nations agencies. 
The regional committee is working with four departmental committees, one for each 
department that is affected by the BH/ISIS-WA crisis: Nguigmi, Bosso, Diffa and Mainé 
Soroa. The departmental committees coordinate all activities that take place in their respective 
areas. They are the main actors in charge of the communication, the reception, the 
reconciliation/reintegration and monitoring phases of the National Program. 
The Goudoumaria Reception Center is managed by the GNN through a security 
detachment that reports to the MoI. The GNN manager is to be assisted by a technical director 
with rehabilitation expertise who is responsible for the operational planning and 
implementation of activities in the camp. Officers of the anti-terrorist police unit conduct the 
profiling and sorting of BH/ISIS-WA defectors. 
However, the institutional framework is poorly implemented. All actors working on 
prosecution processes, institutional reform initiatives and rehabilitation programs should be 
coordinated through a focal point, that would enable for information exchange and 
collaboration. In the case of Niger, there is currently no Steering Committee, no national 
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coordinator and no technical director at the Goudoumaria Center. To start the screening phase, 
and in the absence of the Steering Committee, the MoI organized a special meeting of the 
inter-ministerial committee including the Prosecutor and some actors of the international 
community.40 
 
The Screening Process 
 
According to the National Program, only those who voluntarily defect from BH/ISIS-WA can 
benefit from the rehabilitation program at the camp of Goudoumaria. Nonetheless, this 
excludes perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and other serious 
crimes. In order to verify their eligibility, the defectors have to undergo a screening. The term 
“screening” refers to the initial process of determining the profile of an individual under the 
responsibility of authorities, in order to recommend the next course of action: either 
rehabilitation or prosecution.  
From September to December 2018, IOM worked closely with the SCLCT to improve 
the profiling of individuals associated with VEOs. An initial assessment indicated that 
registration was done in writing and that the information collected was limited and not 
centralized.  
The information collected came from an arrest form which only provided limited 
information, namely: the place of arrest, the equipment seized from the arrested individual, 
the circumstances of the arrest, the comments of the concerned individual and those of the 
investigator.41 Meanwhile, for the defectors at the Goudoumaria Center, SCLCT investigators 
had not registered them, and arrest forms or interview reports had not been issued. 
In close collaboration with the SCLCT, IOM developed a software for the registration 
and screening of disengaged combatants.42 In accordance with data protection requirements, 
 
40 Meeting of the Inter-ministerial committee on the disengaged combatants, 17 June 2019 
41 Assessment on the registration process conducted by IOM with the Pôle Spécialisé against Terrorism and the 
SCLCT between June to October 2018 
42 Registration and Screening Software developed by IOM and the SCLCT in December 2018 
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the software captures personal and biographical information biometrically, assesses each 
person’s risk level through an automatic scoring system and determines a rehabilitation 
profile for each individual. In addition, the system operates as an Internet network for data 
entry between the office of the SCLCT in Niamey and its sub-office in Diffa. Through this 
network, the Office of the Prosecutor's is also able to consult the database. In December 2018, 
IOM organized a training delivered to 20 SCLCT agents on how to use of the software, the 
psychosocial approach and data protection. The trainees were also briefed on the planned 
registration operation in Goudoumaria. 
 
The Registration 
The SCLCT is in charge of collecting information on the combatants associated with 
VEOs. It also collects information from other security forces that undertake a basic form of 
registration mainly for the individuals arrested on the frontline.   
In January 2019, IOM supported the SCLCT in the implementation of a 10-day pilot 
mission in Goudoumaria Reception Center. As a result, a biometric database was created 
thanks to the screening and registering of all individuals residing in the center, this included 
both ex-BH/ISIS-WA fighters but also their dependents (except the minors). This operation 
was an opportunity to test the first version of the registration software.  
According to the National Program, the stay at the Diffa police station for a BH/ISIS-
WA affiliates must not extend beyond 48 hours for the registration process. Following the 
registration, the profiling in Goudoumaria must not exceed 30 days. However, given the 
distance between Diffa and Goudoumaria and the fact that the disengaged individuals were 
already located in the Goudoumria center since 2016, the pilot operation undertook the 
registration and the profiling at the same time. The software also allowed to speed up the 
operation and avoid countless travels to the remote area of Goudoumaria.  
While a second version of the software is already under development, the first version 
used for the registration operation includes the following:43 
 
43 Registration and Screening Software developed by IOM and the SCLCT in December 2018 
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- A dashboard presenting the statistics and the overall progress (number of individuals 
disaggregated by: gender, age, registered, profiled, reintegrated, returned to legal 
proceedings, etc.); 
- A search system in the database by name, by an index number (created by the 
software) or by fingerprint; 
- A biometric registration method that groups individuals by family; 
- A system for scanning documents that individuals may have in their possession; 
- A confidential file allowing health staff to indicate the state of health and the specific 
medical needs of the individuals; 
- A file on the history of the individual’s involvement with VEOs and a scoring system 
to assess the level of risk and the category under which they would fall. This allows 
the investigator to submit his recommendations to the Prosecutor's Office; 
- The decision of the Prosecutor's Office (rehabilitation, prosecution or additional 
investigation); 
- A file on the professional capacities and aspirations of the individual to help them in 
their reintegration; 
During a workshop on prosecution organized in Niamey by the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in November 2018,44 the investigators of the SCLCT 
presented the new registration system. Representatives of the SCLCT and participants from 
the Prosecutor’s office expressed their desire to use this registration software to establish a 
data collection for all individuals currently held in detention centers. To this date, there are no 
registration and screening operations of individuals who are currently held in preventive 
detention on charges of association with VEOs despite there being an estimated 600 to 800 
persons suspected of terrorism held in preventive detention, 80% of whom are BH/ISIS-WA 
associates.45 
 
44 CTED/UNODC, Atelier national sur les approches en matière de triage et de poursuite des personnes associées 
à Boko Haram au Niger, Niamey, 19 – 21 novembre 2018 
45 Based on information from the Judicial Pole Specialized in the fight against Terrorism and Transnational 
Crime, May 2019 
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The Profiling 
While the registration phase can be quick, the profiling process might take longer. 
Indeed, it requires taking into account different variables collected during registration based 
on a psychosocial evaluation and individual interviews on the history of the individuals 
regarding their involvement with the VEO. During interviews, the investigators ask a series of 
questions to establish the category in which the disengaged combatant falls, based on the 
nature of the committed crimes and the motivation to join the VEO. The National Program 
developed in June 2018 identifies 6 categories: 
 
1. Persons captured by or forced to join the group but who have not been involved in 
terrorist activities; 
2. Persons who voluntarily joined the group for reasons other than terrorism (e.g. crime, 
rebellion, economic) and who did not carry arms;  
3. Persons who voluntarily joined the group to support the terrorist cause but did not take 
up arms or commit crimes;  
4. Persons forced to join the group who have been forced to take up arms and have 
committed crimes;  
5. Persons who voluntarily joined the group for reasons other than terrorism (e.g. crime, 
rebellion, economic) and who have taken up arms and committed crimes; 
6. Persons who voluntarily joined the group to support the VEO cause and carried 
weapons and committed crimes, etc. 
In accordance with the legal framework, if a disengaged combatant falls in one of the 
last three abovementioned categories, further investigation will be carried out and a transfer to 
the Specialized Judicial Unit for prosecution will be considered.46 
In order to help overcome the logistical and security difficulties in accessing the 
Goudoumaria center, an automatic ranking system has been added to the registration software 
to help agents categorize the individuals and speed up the profiling process. Depending on the 
 
46 This has been confirmed during the Inter-ministerial committee on the disengaged combatants, 17 June 2019 
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answers provided during the interview, the software calculates the risk level percentage of 
each individual and defines the corresponding category. For this purpose, 17 questions are 
asked to assess the risk percentage and 11 questions are used to determine the category. The 
aim of the questions is to determine several aspects such as motivation to join the group, 
operations conducted while in the group, the role of the individual during each operation, the 
nature of the targets, the type of weapon used, etc. Each answer is assigned a value ranging 
from 0 to 10. The weighted calculation provides the level of risk. 
The categorization uses key information such as: the age of the individual at the time 
of his/her participation in the group (under or over 18 years), how the person joined the group 
(forced or voluntary), their motivations (ideological or other), acts committed (misdemeanor 
or crime), the nature of the targets (civil or military), etc. 
The scoring tool thus provides an automatic risk level and categorization of 
individuals to facilitate the work of SCLCT agents. 
 
The Triage 
The triage is the term used in the National Program for the final decision by the 
Prosecutor's Office to transfer former associates to rehabilitation or prosecution. The 
Specialized Judicial Unit Prosecutor's Office began conducting triage at the end of June 2019 
and the first results were submitted to the MoJ on 22 July 2019. The methodology used by the 
team of the Prosecutor's office consists in dividing the caseload into 4 groups: 
 
1. Unaccompanied minors (for whom the prosecutor requested their placement at the 
CTOs in Niamey); 
2. Minors accompanied by their mothers (or legal guardians); 
3. Individuals (including wives of defectors) who have not committed any criminal act 
and who have had their area taken over by BH/ISIS-WA and have taken refuge in 
Niger; 
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4. Individuals associated with BH/ISIS-WA on whom further investigation is required to 
clarify their involvement in serious crimes; 
In the interests of the children, the Prosecutor also decided that if the parents or 
guardians are not to be prosecuted, the minors would remain with their parents at the center 
during their rehabilitation. However, if the parents are to be prosecuted and detained, the 
minors will be placed in the CTOs until they reach the age of majority. 
Through this approach, the Prosecutor's Office started by identifying unaccompanied 
minors. As a result, 13 unaccompanied minors were identified and will be transferred to the 
CTOs. Subsequently, using the information provided by the SCLCT, the Prosecutor's Office 
was able to identify 45 individuals who had not committed any crimes within the group, 
hence making them eligible for enrollment in the rehabilitation program. 
As this article was written, the Prosecutor's Office is in the process of examining the 
information on those disengaged who had voluntarily joined terrorist groups and carried 
weapons. Because the security forces and the SCLCT have not collected any evidence at the 
time of their surrender, the screening process is essentially based on confessions. Should the 
Prosecutor's Office call for more investigations for these cases, it is difficult to estimate the 
time it would take in a context of insecurity and displaced communities. Furthermore, Niger 
does not have a kind of Truth Commission tasked with discovering and revealing crimes by 
BH that would provide a safe space for victims to testify about their experience and enable the 
SCLCT to collect information outside the Goudoumaria Centre.  
Individuals identified as having committed crimes are expected to be prosecuted. 
However, should they have denounced other members involved with NSAG, they can perhaps 
benefit from a reduced sentence in recognition of their cooperation with the authorities.47 In 
order for this arrangement to work, the Prosecutor would have to collect information on the 
level of collaboration that the defectors have had with the justice system. 
 
47 Meeting with the Prosecutor in May 2019 
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Meanwhile, international partners such as IOM have continued to support the SCLCT 
and the Prosecutor’s Office to harmonize and coordinate their efforts through the 
establishment of SOPs on the screening process for disengaged combatants. 
 
Conclusion and Challenges 
 
As an attempt to support the transition from conflict to stabilization, the GoN has recorded 
some impressive achievements in a short period time. The efficient set-up of the DDRR  
program has undoubtedly helped to reach the current phase of screening. This step was 
achieved thanks to the fulfilment of preconditions. In just over a year, Niger adopted its 
National Program for the treatment of disengaged BH/ISIS-WA associates (June 2018), set-up 
a legal framework to rehabilitate low-risk disengaged NSAG associates (December 2018), 
established a database to profile the 235 individuals living in the Goudoumaria Reception 
Center (January 2019) and screened low risk disengaged combatants (June 2019). 
Nonetheless, despite this rapid evolution of DDRR to address changing realities, challenges 
related to the screening remain. These comprise notably the political and judicial conditions 
that need to be met for the National Program to be carried out successfully. 
 
The Weak Capacity of the State 
State capacity determines whether state actors are able to coordinate efforts across 
governmental bodies in order to fulfill DDRR commitments. Central to this argument is the 
idea that the Nigerien defectors management system only depends on the state’s own 
capacity. Due to other critical emergencies in the Lake Chad Basin region, the implementation 
of the National DDRR Program has resulted in a consequential extension of workload for 
designated state agents requiring the absorption of a new responsibilities, in addition to their 
initial duties. The National Program gives a central role to the GoN, precisely in areas where 
state capacity is weak. Additional resources need to be committed and a coordination 
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framework that needs to be created, involving all capable actors that have a comprehensive 
understanding of the overall DDRR process. 
The development of the National Program and its dissemination in the Diffa region 
was designed in an attempt to establish ownership and develop national coordination in the 
DDRR process. International partners have worked to articulate collectively the capacity 
building requirements to align themselves with the National Program. Despite the weak 
capacity of the state and its difficulty in setting up a coordination mechanism, the DDRR 
process has made noticeable progress and is in the process of completing its screening phase. 
 
Limitations of Judicial Investigations 
The triage phase whereby BH/ISIS-WA affiliates must undergo a screening process to 
ensure that they do not have a record of human rights abuse is a new process in Niger. It was 
initiated by the recent update of the legal framework and the adoption of the new National 
Program determining the different categories of NSAG associates. The legal framework 
defines the conditions under which a person associated with a VEO can participate in the 
rehabilitation program, provided that they have not committed serious crimes. To make this 
distinction, the Prosecutor's Office refers to the Penal Code, which differentiates between 
treatment related to crime and to misdemeanor. Transposed into the DDRR process, only 
defectors who have committed misdemeanors can be enrolled in the rehabilitation program. 
The perpetrators of crimes on the other hand are to be prosecuted.  
While the Prosecutor's Office team quickly identified individuals eligible for the 
rehabilitation program, it encountered more difficulty with the group of adults who joined 
BH/ISIS-WA and carried arms. Because the information collected by the SCLCT was based 
on confessions, it is difficult to establish whether the information is reliable. In order to carry 
out a proper screening, the Prosecutor's Office indicated that it needed more evidence through 
additional investigations.  
In order for the Prosecutor's Office to make a decision, it is imperative that the 
information collected during investigations are in line with the law. By responding to this 
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need, the screening procedure has enabled SCLCT officers and the prosecution team to 
strengthen their collaboration. It has also allowed SCLCT investigators to better understand 
the provisions of the legal framework and the Prosecutor's Office to better understand the 
constraints related to investigations in the Diffa region. 
 
Collaboration with the Justice System 
Whether for surrendering or arrested individuals, the investigation procedure requires 
SCLCT investigators to collect information in the Diffa region and to conduct witness 
investigations. This proves to be a challenging endeavor given the context of Diffa region. 
Parts of the region are insecure, reducing the possibilities to conduct investigations with the 
states’ limited resources. Some witnesses and family members of defectors live in Internally 
Displaced Person (IDP) and refugee camps in Niger or Nigeria, further complexifying the 
work for investigators. Finally, there are no truth commission to collect victims' testimonies. 
Truth commissions serve an important tool for investigation and reporting on VEO actions, in 
an attempt to understand the extent and patterns of past violations. In this context, the 
Goudoumaria Centre is an organic and spontaneous space that offers information to 
investigators that can be used for prosecutorial recommendations as they were able to conduct 
investigations and hearings in a secure space. Nonetheless, the creation of a truth commission 
should be a complementary process to the judicial system. 
 
Towards a Witness Protection System 
Witness testimony has critical value in investigating and prosecuting VEO crimes. 
According to the current legal framework, disengaged individuals convicted of serious crimes 
have to serve a prison sentence. However, in the absence of a dedicated prison, these 
individuals will serve their sentence in the same prison as those they have denounced. This 
represents a considerable risk to their own security. Hence, a system for their protection in the 
prison environment is fundamental. 
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In addition, the fact that they have fled BH/ISIS-WA and collaborated with the GoN 
exposes these defectors to reprisals from the VEOs they defected from. Having been a 
member of BH/ISIS-WA also exposes them to reprisals from the reintegration communities. 
However, during the various discussions with the defectors at the Goudoumaria Centre, they 
explained that their main fear was linked to the reprisal attacks by BH/ISIS-WA while fear of 
host communities only came second in the ranking of their concerns. 
While most reintegration programs take place in communities of origin through 
reconciliation ceremonies coupled with community recovery program, reintegration must also 
ensure the safety of individuals for it to be successful. 
At this stage, the reintegration phase has not yet started and it is difficult to predict 
how the GoN will carry it out. However, in view of the existing risks of retaliatory violence, 
discretion and confidentiality should be ensured during the reintegration phase. In the absence 
of a witness protection program, traditional reconciliation activities such as forgiveness and 
reconciliation ceremonies should be limited and low-profile reintegration should be applied. 
Finally, the police should be involved in monitoring and protecting former associates to 
guarantee their security. 
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